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Abstract: This Trends article discusses multiple political psychological aspects of the August 29, 2003 car
bomb explosion adjacent to the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, Iraq
The August 29, 2003 car bomb explosion adjacent to the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, Iraq is another
human tragedy for those were killed and injured, yet another seeming impediment to Iraqi security and
stabilization, and still another example of why such acts can be politically beneficial to their
perpetrators.
As to the last observation, initial reactions and reports comprise at least several theories and
attributions as to the perpetrators and those behind them. One narrative focuses on supporters of
Saddam Hussein and members of the Baath Party. Supporters and members may have engaged in the
car bomb explosion to impede Iraqi security and stabilization. Another narrative focuses on the United
States (US) and its coalition allies. They are responsible for the tragedy because they are responsible for
a security that has not been forthcoming or has been violated. Yet another narrative focuses on Zionist
conspiracy. This conspiracy has allegedly been long ongoing and seeks to keep Islam and Arabs down
and Judaism and Israel up through murder, propaganda, and the hoarding of global material assets.
Other narratives attribute blame to Sunnis targeting Shiites and Shiites targeting Shiites. The former is
founded on a centuries old conflict over the origins of Islam, the latter over a more contemporary
conflict for supremacy of Iraqi Shiism and Iraq itself.
Many of these narratives are or can be mutually reinforcing much more easily than mutually
contradicting. For example, Baathists and Sunnis could reasonably collaborate in an attempt to regain
power lost since the demise of the Saddam Hussein government. The US and Israel could reasonably
collaborate—assuming US goals for Iraq of free markets and representative democracy are compatible
with Israeli security and material well-being. Even Shiite and Sunni adversaries could be temporary
collaborators against a joint adversary—viz., the US.
In fact, reason as an epistemological vehicle to identify the source of the car bomb explosion can seem
to be a promiscuous lover of Truth as truths. The same seems to apply to other epistemological
vehicles. One may believe in whatever a respected communicator communicates through the vehicle of
authority. One may believe in what one believes because one believes it through the vehicle of faith. Or
one may believe through empirical data.
But these epistemological vehicles are almost always interactive and difficult to isolate. For example,
one can wittingly or unwittingly attend to and apply empirical data to support pre-existing faith and
belief in authority.
The upshot of the explosion of truths is an environment of cover, camouflage, and deception within
which terrorist perpetrators can operate. This environment—along with the history of terrorism often
being a successful force multiplier of the conventionally weak against the conventionally strong—would
seem to ensure that the war against terrorism may be managed for the better or for the worse. But this
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war can never be won. (See Batteau, A.W. (2002). Anthropological approaches to culture, aviation, and
flight safety. Human Factors & Aerospace Safety, 2, 147-171; Keinan, G., Sadeh, A., & Rosen, S. (2003).
Attitudes and reactions to media coverage of terrorist acts. Journal of Community Psychology, 31, 149165; MacFarquhar, N., & Oppel, R.A., Jr. (August 30, 2003). Car bomb in Iraq kills 95 at Shiite Mosque:
Moderate cleric is among dead. The New York Times, pp;. A1, A6; Pedahzur, A., Perliger, A., &
Weinberg, L. (2003). Altruism and fatalism: The characteristics of Palestinian suicide terrorists. Deviant
Behavior, 24, 405-423; Walker, K. L., & Chestnut, D. (2003). The role of ethnocultural variables in
response to terrorism. Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychology, 9, 251-262.) (Keywords: Baath
Party, Car Bomb, Iraq, Security, Terrorism.)
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